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Questions regarding the ontology of artworks have been discussed by scholars for 
many years, however, increased digitalisation of such artworks means we are now 
facing new ontological issues. This paper seeks to raise questions regarding the 
ontological status of online dance films. By examining philosophical discourses from 
Graham McFee, Peggy Phelan, Richard Wollheim and Philip Auslander, I investigate 
how recorded versions of dance performances that exist on the Internet impact on 
established understandings of dance ontology. 
Peggy Phelan claims that “[p]erformance in a strict ontological sense is 
nonreproductive”.1  She argues that performance cannot be documented, and that if it 
is “it becomes something other than performance”.2 This suggests that the ephemeral 
nature of a performance is crucial to its ontology. She claims that although works can 
be performed more than once, each performance is essentially a different thing. The 
notion that the exact event in the exact time that it exists cannot be repeated is central 
to Phelan’s argument. Due to this characteristic, Phelan believes that the recording or 
reproducing of performance “betrays and lessens the promise of its own ontology”. 3 
These observations raise questions regarding the ontological status of recorded 
documentation and highlight the significance of ‘liveness’. For example, can someone 
say that she has seen a particular performance if she has only seen a video of the 
                                                 
1
  Phelan (1993), p.148. 
2
  Phelan (1993), p.146. 
3
  Phelan (1993), p.146. 
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event? Following Phelan’s argument, this would not be seeing the performance, as a 
performance can only exist in the time and space in which it is performed. I wish to 
ask: what, then has she seen? Whilst someone watching only the film may not have 
seen the live performance, I suggest that she will have, in some sense, experienced the 
performance. 
 Filmed recordings are widely enjoyed by art audiences and are used in the study 
and documentation of performance. Therefore an investigation into their ontological 
status is important. By considering the potential ‘liveness’ of recordings and 
overlapping ontological features of film and live performance, I seek to understand 
how the two formats relate to one another.   
Graham McFee observes that performing arts “must be brought into completeness 
by being performed”.4 Their specific form of existence makes performance works, 
such as Swan Lake, abstract notions until they are instanced. This means that 
performances are harder to access than forms which always physically exist, such as 
painting, meaning fewer people see and discuss performance and that it is easy for 
performances to get lost or forgotten over time. Without a physical record 
performance exists only in memory and dialogue. This status as memory does not 
make the work necessarily non-existent outside of performance.  We are able to 
discuss, visualise and re-perform the work, meaning that, arguably, it still exists. 
However, this temporary existence in the physical world means that performance can 
be considered unimportant in art discourse and history, as it cannot always be 
accessed.  This has generated an ongoing focus on the documentation of performance 
via writing, film and notation in order to maintain performance’s place in history.  
How such documentations relate to the initial performance and the abstract notion of 
the work is the key issue in this investigation. 
 
I. THE ONTOLOGY OF DANCE 
Dance has a specific ontology that is distinct from other performance art forms. 
Whilst it fits into the category of performance, it is different from theatre and music, 
as dance works do not originate from physical objects. Theatre and musical works 
traditionally relate to a physical text or score, which are as much the work as the live 
performance. Aside from notated works, which are fairly rare, dance does not share 
                                                 
4
  McFee (1992), p. 89.  
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this feature. This means that dance possesses a particularly fluid ontological status; 
works are physically present only temporarily.   
Phelan claims that performance is non-reproductive, and each instance of 
performance is a different ‘thing’, Graham McFee, however, aims to “acknowledge its 
permanence” and points out that “the very same dance can be re-performed at some 
later date”.5 An important issue with Phelan’s argument is that if the work is 
performed more than once, she considers each performance a completely different 
thing. This is problematic; Swan Lake is considered to be Swan Lake, regardless of 
whether it is the Friday or Saturday version. Indeed it is considered to be Swan Lake, 
regardless of where it is performed and whom it is performed by, providing it meets 
the constraints of the type, and is, therefore recognisable as Swan Lake. 
In order to explain how it is possible for different performances to be the same 
thing, McFee, amongst others, draws a distinction between “particular objects” and 
“multiples”.6 Particulars, he suggests are objects such as The Mona Lisa, whereas 
James Joyce’s Ulysses is typical of a multiple, in that there are many copies of the 
same thing. McFee points out that things such as novels, dances and pieces of music 
are usually multiples. In order to discuss the nature of multiples McFee borrows 
Wollheim’s  terminology of ‘types’ and ‘tokens’. Wollheim sets out to address the 
issue that “certain works of art are not physical objects” 7 and looks to establish what 
kind of thing they are. In order to identify what it is that music and novels are, 
Wollheim borrows the term ‘type’ from Peirce. He goes on to say, “Correlative to the 
term ‘type’ is the term ‘token’ […] In other words, Ulysses and Der Rosenkavalier are 
types, my copy of Ulysses and tonight’s performance of Rosenkavalier are tokens of 
those types”.8 This relationship helps to clarify the way in which a work of art can 
have many manifestations. For the purpose of this paper I am going to make use of 
McFee’s and Wollheim’s distinction between types and tokens to examine online 
dance recordings. 
 
II. THE RECORDING OF DANCE 
My focus in this paper is on a relatively new mode of filmed performance to be found 
on the Internet, especially on dance company websites and video sharing sites such as 
                                                 
5
  McFee (1992), p.89. 
6
  Wollheim (1968), p. 90. 
7
  Wollheim (1968), p.91. 
8
  Wollheim (1968), p.91. 
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YouTube. These filmed versions of live works are heavily edited to fit into the 
technical restraints of digital media. They tend to take two forms: the first being a 
traditional style documentation, whereby the piece stays true to the time frame of the 
live event. The second form is a version of the work that is highly edited, in order to 
fit the predominant features of the work into a specified length. These films are used 
primarily for marketing purposes and give a brief overview of the dynamics, 
movement style and quality of the live performance, in much the same way that a 
written newspaper review or press release might. In this sense they are essentially a 
representation of the live work, as opposed to documentation.   
One such film, which carries many of the typical features of this medium, is an 
edited version of Rafael Bonachela’s The Land of Yes and The Land of No (2009) 
(henceforth, TLYTLN). The live performance lasts approximately 90 minutes. It 
consists of six dancers performing abstract movement. The stimulus for the work is 
the signs that govern our daily lives and the effect that these instructions have on us. 
The movement is primarily fluid and its dynamic qualities range from soft and slow to 
sharp, fast and angular. The work is made up of multiple sections, which flow into 
one another without disjuncture. In the edited representation the piece has been 
condensed into four minutes. The film consists of sections, of approximately 30 
seconds each; every scene is cut sharply and replaced by a new theme or idea. The 
selected movement material contains unison, counter-point, duet, solo and contact 
work lending unpredictability to the work. The editorial style presents brief, fast-
paced images creating a frenetic quality that is distinct from the movement dynamics. 
The result is that tranquil moments from the live work are lent a different energetic 
quality through the editorial process. The disruption of time also changes the nature of 
the movement, as we are not able to experience individual movements, motifs or 
energy patterns developing.  
Some consideration of these films is important due to the apparently infinite 
possibilities of virtual media in terms of access and longevity.  The way that 
performance is represented via a digital portal, in a form that has dramatically 
departed from the live work, is of specific interest in the context of this investigation. 
Unlike many dance recordings, which focus on replicating and reproducing the 
experience of live performance, these films present a new form of dance recording. 
Their edited state and virtual existence create a complex ontology that is different 
from other types of dance recordings. 
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III. THE ONTOLOGY OF RECORDED DOCUMENTATIONS 
An enquiry into the ontology of performance was what led Peggy Phelan to claim that 
non-reproductiveness is central to the essence of the form. So where then does that 
leave us in terms of investigating the ontological status of repeatable documentations 
or representations of performances? Whilst Phelan claims that performances cannot 
be repeated, this is problematic. Borrowing the terms ‘type’ and ‘token’ from McFee 
allows us to understand how different performances of the same work can exist. The 
type/token schema allows us to consider a dance work such as TLYTLN as a type, and 
each performance of it as a token of that type. 
This line of thought can help us to clarify the positioning of filmed documentations 
in relation to a dance work, as we can ask: is a filmed version of a performance a 
token of that work? Is it the same thing or the same type of thing as the work? McFee 
points out that these issues are not concerned with similarity but rather asking if it is 
exactly the same thing.9 In order to establish whether a film can be considered the 
same thing as the work, we first need to decide whether or not ephemerality is a 
crucial feature of the work. Considering the way in which dance works are developed 
– as performances – it seems safe to suggest that liveness (and therefore ephemerality) 
is a fundamental ontological feature. However, there are problems with this analysis. 
In recent years there have been works created specifically for film, challenging the 
significance of live performance. There is a potential argument here that there was a 
performance that took place during filming, therefore requiring us to establish what is 
needed to classify action as performance. In this paper I will focus on work, which is 
developed as live performance and subsequently documented. In this instance, if 
liveness is crucial to the work’s identity, it would seem that a recorded version of a 
live work cannot be a token of that work, whether or not it has been edited.  By being 
viewed on a screen, after the event has occurred, it fails to fit the constraints of the 
type.  However, if we accept that only things that can be tokens of a work are live 
performances of that work, we are left with the question, what is a recording of a live 
performance?  
The question of the film's relationship to the abstract concept of the ‘work’ is 
complicated. It does not seem appropriate to say that the film is a token, as it is not 
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  McFee (1992), p.90. 
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exactly the same as a performance – which is already established as the token of the 
type. We cannot have two varieties of token for the same type: therefore we must 
accept that these films are not tokens. However, it is not the case that a filmed 
recording of a performance is a completely different thing to the live performance. We 
still consider these films to be the work, in some sense. Due to the fact that essential 
components of the work are presented, the filmed version of TLYTLN is still part of 
the identity of TLYTLN. This is due to more than aesthetic similarities. Even when 
edited, the content, and therefore essence, of the film is the token (the performance), 
and therefore the type (the work). Whilst it arguably possesses its own ontological 
status, it cannot be divorced from the “work” altogether. Here we have reached the 
crux of the issue: the established type/token schema does not allow for consideration 
of the relationship between filmed representation and type. This is an increasingly 
relevant issue, as digital representation of art expands, the Internet frequently becomes 
our first, and often only contact with dance works. Therefore, it is crucial that we are 
able to understand what these things are.  
We have two options at this juncture: we can accept that these films do not fit 
within the type/token schema, or we can experiment with the idea that a film can be 
considered a type in its own right.  Option one establishes the need to develop a new 
taxonomy for dealing with this issue. This is a complex task; the digitalisation of art 
has generated multiple types of things. We need to consider the nature of 
documentation and representation, the distinctions between the two, and how this 
impacts on ontology. For example, there are dance performances screened live onto 
cinema screens, works made specifically for the Internet that are or are not performed 
live, full-length works, edited works and works created with computer programmes, 
to name a few.  
In order to establish a schema that allows us to consider how these relate to the 
work, we must first decide whether each of these types of thing are the same as one 
another. It does not seem feasible that we can consider all digital versions of 
performance in the same category, due to the fact that they are developed in different 
ways, with different functions. There are ontological distinctions to be made between 
documentation, live relay and representation. Each of these outcomes has a unique 
relationship to the work; meaning multiplicity is needed in order to explain such 
phenomena.  The development of a new, or altered understanding system is beyond 
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the remit of this paper, but these issues show us how digitalisation is impacting and 
challenging established ways of understanding dance.  
Here I will take the second option and examine whether or not we can consider 
these films as types in their own right. This is a pragmatically sound option. Common 
parlance suggests that we draw a distinction between the live performance and the 
filmed version, and consider the film a thing in its own right. For example in response 
to the question 'Have you seen Bonachela's The Land of Yes and The Land of No?' it 
would be perfectly reasonable to state, 'I have watched the film'. This is where the 
difference between the documentation and representation becomes particularly 
significant, as this is an unlikely response had you seen only the edited film, given the 
way in which it does not replicate the live performance.   
Leaving aside for a moment the question about which film you’ve seen and 
whether or not that means you've seen the work, it seems reasonable to consider a 
filmed version of a performance as a type, (of which there are many copies on video 
or DVD which are tokens of that type). However, films which exist only on the 
Internet problematise this relationship.  The issue here is not their edited state or non-
naturalistic representation of performance. If the edited version of TLYTLN existed as 
a DVD of which there were multiple copies it would adopt the same ontological status 
in relation to this element of the type/token discussion. The fact that these films exist 
only in the virtual sphere removes them from the above relationship.  
We cannot say there are multiple physical manifestations of the same abstract type, 
but rather multiple viewings of the same thing. Whilst manifested through a physical 
object (the screen), the film exists digitally, but not always in its embodied form. 
Where and how the information exists, outside of encoding and viewing, could be 
considered here. This is a complicated issue; digital information is stored in different 
places, in different ways depending on how it is created and uploaded. For example, 
would we draw a distinction between a film that is recorded onto a memory card and 
one that uploads straight onto the Internet?10  
What is of more significance is that the film exists in a different, dormant, and 
potentially abstract state until it is enacted. So, does this imply that each instance of 
viewing the film is a token, correlative to the type? Or suggest that the films are 
particulars? This is implausible as these films have no static presence of their own and 
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  Blackwell (2011). 
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can exist in multiple places at the same time. Whether or not the films exist in coding, 
the notion of the film is still abstract. This means that – despite there being no 
physical object, such as a DVD – virtual films can potentially still be considered a 
type, of which each viewing is a token.  So, if we consider the dance work a type and 
the filmed version of the work also a type, the question here remains: what connects 
the two types? This again highlights the limited applicability of the schema to 
recordings. 
Whilst these questions can be asked of any type of digital information, we can start 
to see how these films share ontological features with performance. If information on 
the Internet comes ‘into existence’ only when required, then it exists in a similar way 
to a performance. Whether or not the two things exist – as code and memory when 
dormant – neither the performance nor the film possess a permanent physical 
‘original’, due to the lack of score.  These ontological overlaps between films and live 
performance are not enough to suggest they are the same thing, however it goes some 
way to deal with Phelan’s problem with recordings. She claims that it is the fact that 
recordings are not ephemeral which means they detract from performance’s ontology. 
However, they are ephemeral, they share key existential characteristics with 
performance and, (to borrow McFee’s explanation of performing art) are encountered 
only when instantiated. 
 
IV. THE PERFORMATIVITY OF RECORDINGS 
There are also similarities in the way that we experience live performance and films, 
according to Philip Auslander, who disputes the notion that filmed or televised 
performances are ontologically different from live performance. He suggests that 
television offers “no sensuous distinction between the live and the repeat or replay”, 
and that “its production as a televisual image occurs only in the present moment”.11 
This suggests that the experience of watching something on television is as 
significantly momentary as live performance, and implies that the same is true of 
filmed recordings.  
This leads us to the issue of repetition: one of the central points to Phelan’s 
argument is that performance can never be repeated, which is not the case for films. 
However Auslander argues that repetition of the viewing experience is only a 
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  Auslander (2007), p. 51. 
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possibility, rather than an ontological feature of the medium. He suggests that the 
potential for repetition is not an intrinsic feature of the viewing experience. If we are 
watching something for the first time, repetition is not relevant. He questions the 
significance of exact repetition and suggests that film and television images exist only 
in the present. Disappearance is also addressed by Auslander, who argues that films 
and videos also ‘disappear’ due to the fact that they deteriorate over time. He suggests 
that due to the fact that they erode each time we watch a video tape it is the only time 
we will see it in that specific state of being.  
Whilst Auslander addresses neither the hugely different time frame for 
disappearance for live performance and video, nor whether or not this is applicable to 
computer code, he does raise some interesting counter-arguments to Phelan’s account 
of the ontological specificity of ephemerality. By suggesting that filmed recordings 
are ephemeral, he implies that Phelan’s issues with the permanence of recordings are 
unfounded. If liveness is fundamental to performance and these films are also live, 
they cannot be considered a ‘betrayal’ to the form’s ontology.  
 The implication is that performances are repeatable – films are ephemeral, and 
filmed images are time specific in terms of the viewer’s experience. They therefore 
can be considered to be ‘performed’. This notion is problematic, as a recording of a 
performance offers no scope for variability. During a live performance the possibility 
of events such as a mistake, a fall, power cut, or sneeze all contribute to the 
uniqueness of that single moment in time. Once the performance is recorded this 
element is lost. Stephen Davies points out, in relation to music, that once we cannot 
experience the “performer’s decisions as spontaneous […] they lose their immediacy 
and vibrancy”.12 He goes on to suggest, however, that if we appreciate that a 
recording is of a live performance we are able to recognise that “the performance 
options were taken in real time and under the usual circumstances”.13  
It seems that it is the variability of performance that is important to Phelan. In 
relation to edited representations though, this invariability becomes potentially less 
significant. The nature of these edited films suggest that they are not aiming to 
replicate live performance, which distinguishes this form of representation from many 
other forms of dance recordings. This seems paradoxical – the editorial decisions 
imply a desire to create a sense of unpredictability and vibrancy by creating short, 
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frantic scenes. However, this is not necessarily connected to a desire to replicate 
liveness. Here we need to call on Davies’ observation and note that because we are 
aware that the content was recorded live, we can appreciate the vibrancy and potential 
for variability that existed in the original instance.  
By understanding how we can consider films ontologically linked to performance, 
we can question Phelan’s claim that reproductions are something other than 
performance. This impacts on the significance of liveness and therefore our previous 
understandings of dance ontology. We are able to see how this phenomenon 
challenges our previous ways of understanding dance. Whilst these films do not 
necessarily change the initial relationship between the work and the performance, they 
embody a new form of dance that is inexplicable within the current schema. 
Auslander’s arguments have shown us how films can be considered ‘live’. This 
further questions Phelan’s thesis. Recordings, like live performances, are 
simultaneously live and repeatable. They are made from the performance and share 
the name of the work. Therefore, we can begin to suggest, they are as much a 
performance of the work as the live event. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
We can see how liveness is not a set concept. The way in which recordings share key 
ontological features with performance helps us to re-evaluate the notion of the live. 
Recordings of performance that exist only on the Internet are ephemeral. They only 
exist in their embodied form when viewed, an event that could be considered an 
instance, in the same way as a live performance are. The marked ‘change’ that Phelan 
discusses between each performance is embodied in the relationship between viewer’s 
body and time. 
Recorded representation does impact on existing understandings of dance 
ontology. By considering how the three components relate to each other, and how 
important this is, we can dispute Phelan’s thesis. For socio-cultural, economic and 
archiving reasons nearly all performances are now recorded. Whilst Phelan believes 
that recording lessens and betrays performance’s ontology, recorded representation 
has become a crucial part of a work’s identity. As opposed to lessening the form, 
documentation plays an important part in forming the ontology of a work, due to the 
fact that it is often our first, or only contact with a work. Establishing exactly what 
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this role is, and how the representation and the work connect through the development 
of a more appropriate understanding system, is the next stage of this investigation.  
There are many forms of digital dance performance. Examination of the 
significance of these various types is important in order to establish whether we can 
consider digital versions of dance performance as possessing one ontological status. 
For example, there is a distinction to be made between edited and non-edited films. 
Non-edited representations have more features in common with the original token, 
however their mode of existence (as recordings), means they are still not exactly the 
same thing as the token, or therefore, the type. Edited virtual films do not share the 
structural and durational features of the performance, yet are still made up of a 
performance. This means that we are seeing a performance of a work, in a re-
represented manner.  
Additionally, if we consider the films as types in their own right, we cannot 
completely disregard Phelan’s analysis, as we seem to be in agreement that 
reproduction is different to performance. Both Phelan and McFee’s explanations of 
dance ontology are problematised by digitalisation. Whilst neither can be completely 
dismissed, they also do not allow for all of the complexities of dance’s existence in 
digital form. Where they leave edited and non-edited films in terms of relating to the 
work is profoundly complex. 
There are multiple ontological quandaries raised by this discussion, some of which 
are not specific to dance.  The ontological status of digital information is an area I am 
only able to touch on here, but this investigation has shown us that such discussions 
carry significance for dance, and in fact may become more relevant in future 
investigations than the current vocabulary of art ontology. It seems evident that the 
very terminology of ‘existence ’, ‘location’ or ‘multiplicity’ is of dubious applicability 
when applied to virtual phenomena. Therefore we must adopt or develop more 
appropriate ways of understanding dance ontology. As dance continues to interact 
with digital technology our ontological analysis of the form and its many shifting 
features must keep pace.  
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the phenomenology of digital performance, and issues of representation and 
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